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Abstract: The objective of this equity analysis was to determine whether Lululemon 
Athletica is undervalued or overvalued to, based on that, make a recommendation to buy, 
sell or hold. There are no clear guidelines for stock price forecast so, in this research, 
quantitative (statistical and peers’ analysis) and qualitative approaches were used to 
calculate the company’s target share price. Lululemon’s revenues, cost of capital and 
return on invested capital were estimated for the next ten years. Once the forecast was 
done, the Discounted Cash Flow Model was used to compute the target price. A value of 
$260.10 was obtained, resulting in a BUY recommendation.   
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 Given our projections for the next decade for Lululemon 
Athletica Inc, we are starting this article with a recommendation to 
BUY. The weighted average target price is $260.10, which gives a 
one-year return of 11.43% for shareholders. 
 Strong quarter results: Lululemon’s earnings and sales in 
Q3 2019 beat for the 11th consecutive time the market expectation. 
As a result, Lululemon’s stock price increased 88.44% last year, 
largely surpassing the 30.01% growth of the industry. 
 Power of Three Strategy. Lululemon has the objective of 
more than doubling men and digital revenues and quadrupling 
international sales within the next 5 years.  To accomplish it, a new 
strategy based on three  pillars was launched: product innovation, 
omni-guest experiences and international expansion. This plan 
affects not only Lululemon’s Company Operated Stores division, but 
also its Direct to Consumer and Others Channels segments. 
 Valuation: To evaluate the company, the Discounted Cash 
Flow Model was used, estimating the revenues for each segment with 
a cost of capital of 6.40% and a perpetuity growth rate of 4.12%. 
The forecasted period ends in 2030 when we believe that the company 
will mature and therefore stabilize. 
 
Company description 
Lululemon Athletica is a yoga-inspired, technical athletic apparel 
company for women and men. Operates through three segments, 
Company Operated Stores, Digital and Other Channels. The company 
has been fighting to gain a place among the sportswear giants. 
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(Values in $ millions) 2018 2019E 2020F 
Revenues 3 288 3 914 5 023 








Net Profit 484 518 691 
    
Revenues Per Segment    
Company Operated Stores 2 126 2 526 3 453 
Direct to Consumer 858 1 001 1 159 
Other Channels 303 386 410 







The momentum of Athletic Apparel 
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1. Company Overview 
Lululemon, with headquarters in Vancouver (Canada), dates its history back to 1998. 
It was founded by Dennis J.Wilson and, ever since, has been committed to its mission: 
“elevate the world from mediocrity to greatness”. It began as a design studio by day 
and a yoga studio by night, and over the years it was able to change, grow and take 
steps towards establishing itself as a worlwide leading sportwear company. At 
the present time, Lululemon is an international firm that provides athletic apparel and 
accessories for all genders, all ages and numerous sports (see Exhibit 1).  
Geographically, as mentioned above, the company already has a worldwide presence 
and is projected to increase further. At the moment, more than 85% of Lululemon 
sales come from the United States and Canada (see Exhibit 2). To reduce the 
dependency on these markets and further develop its business, market expansion to 
China, APAC and EMEA regions is one of Lululemon’s “Power of Three Growth 
Strategy” initiatives. As a matter of fact, international growth has been around 40% 
in the most recent quarters, with China reporting a massive 55% growth in 
comparable sales YoY.  
Lululemon is organized into three different segments: Company-Operated Stores, 
Digital and Others. Company-operated stores represent more than half of Lululemon 
revenues, followed by Digital with 24.64% and finally by Others with 9.28% (see 
Exhibit 3).  
Regarding the evolution of revenues, the company grew 24.13% in 2018, 22.78%, in 
the first quarter of 2019, 22.09% in the second and 22.53% in the third. With this 
strong performance during the first three quarters of the year, and knowing 
Lululemon’s seasonality pattern, where the last quartar usually is stronger than the 
others, we estimate that the company will reach revenues of $3.9 billion in FY19, 
representing a growth of 19.04%. Concerning the segments, last year, Digital 
witnessed an increase of 48%, Company Operated Stores raised 15.75%, and the 




Exhibit 1: Global Sales of the Top 
Performance Apparel, Accessories and 
Footwear Companies in 2019  
Exhibit 2: Revenues by Region  
Source: Company Data 
Exhibit 4: Revenues Growth 








Company-operated stores Direct to consumer Other
Exhibit 3: Revenues by Segment 






































Exhibit 5: Shareholder Composition  
In April 2019, Lululemon announced the “Power of Three Growth Strategy” to drive 
growth. Despite the fact that this topic will be further discussed in the strategy section, 
it is important to highlight that the forecast for the next five years estimates that men’s 
and digital revenues will more than double and that international revenues will 
quadruple as a result of this strategy. As a matter of fact, Digital sales grew 35% in 
Q1 2019, 31% in Q2 2019 and 30% in Q3 2019, while Men’s revenues increased 
33% in Q1 2019, 35% in Q2 2019 and 38% in Q3 2019. These  results, together with 
the current yoga and sportswear trends and Lululemon’s strength as a brand, indicate 
that the company is very likely to achieve its goals. 
1.1 Shareholder Structure 
Regarding Lululemon’s Equity structure1, it is split into four different groups (Exhibit 
5): Institutional Investors, who have the biggest share of the company, representing 
86% of total shares; General Public, that currently account for 8% of total shares; 
Private Companies that currently account for 5% of total shares; and Individual 
Insiders who own the remaining 1% of total shares. In the last few years, the weight 
of Institutional Investors has been increasing, which shows confidence amongst 
professional investors. Nonetheless, if those investors change their view on 
Lululemon’ stock, due to the significant power that they have, the value of the share 
can rapidly decline.  
In contrast to Nike and Adidas, Lululemon’s main competitors, Lululemon has never 
paid cash dividends neither is expecting to do it in the near future. However, the 
company has a stock repurchase program and, thus, has been making share 
buyback for quite a long time now. This program is mainly supported by the company’s 
solid operating cash flows and cash in hand. For example, in FY2018, the company 
concluded with cash and cash equivalents of $881 million and operating cash flows 
of 742.8 million. With a new $500 million repurchase program authorized by the 
company, Lululemon not only emphasizes its focus on increasing shareholder 
value, but also demonstrates the confidence in its own prospects. Actually, during 
the first half of fiscal year 2019, the company already bought back 1.9 million shares 
at a cost of $165.1 million. 
2. Economic Overview 
Lululemon has a strategic plan to further expand its presence worldwide, being 
essential to understand both micro (regional) and macro (global) economy drivers. 
                                                 





















Exhibit 6: Inflation Rate (%) from 2019 to 
2024 
Exhibit 7: GDP Growth (%) from 2019 to 2024 
Exhibit 9: Unemployment Rate (%) from 
2018 to 2021 
Exhibit 8: Evolution of Unemployment Rate (%) 
from 2004 to 2019 
Exhibit 10: Consumer Confidence Index and Consumer Confidence Development from 
2017 to 2019 
The global real GDP growth, an essential economic indicator, is expected to be 
3% in 20192, which compared with the average of 3.3% observed between 2012-
20193, is a slight slowdown. From 2020 onwards, however, a recovery tendency is 
predicted, with an expected 3.4%1 GDP growth in 2020. This economic erratic 
behaviour is partially explained by the trade tension between the US and China, 
the political uncertainty in Europe because of Brexit and Catalonia and the 
unexpected slowdown in some emerging markets. All this induces a lower capital 
investment and a weaker global demand, resulting in a decrease from 3.7% in 2018 
to 1.2% in 2019 in the World Real Trade growth2. Thereafter, a progressive 
improvement to 1.6% in 2020 and 2.3% in 2021 is expected. Regarding the inflation1, 
another important metric, a drop from 3.6% in 2018 to 3.4% in 2019 is predicted, yet 
a new increase to 3.6% is estimated for 2020. In the long term, a world real GDP 
growth of 3,2% and an inflation rate of 3,7% are expected in 20304. 
                  
In terms of the unemployment rate, it is possible to see some signs of recovery 
after the crisis period (Exhibit 8), showing the current market optimism and 
confidence.  However, the labour market is gradually becoming less attractive with 
a deceleration not only on job creation (1.3% in 2018-20192 and a decrease to 
0.64% in 2020-20212), leading to a predicted unemployment rate2 of 5.2% in 2019 and 
around the same level in 2020 and 2021 (5.1%), but also on the real wage growth - 
expected to be 1.2% and 1.1% in 2018-19 and 2020-2021, respectively2. 
Another relevant indicator that shows the reluctance that consumers feel about the 
global economic outlook is the Consumer Confidence Development. As can be 
seen in Exhibit 10, the presented values indicate that consumers are expected to 
keep their spending level despite having an increment in their purchasing power.  
  
                                                 
2 International Monetary Fund 
3 OECD Economic Outlook 
4 Passport 
Source: International Monetary Fund and OECD 
Source: International Monetary Fund 
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2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Canada China United States Euro area
Source: International Monetary Fund 
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
United States 1,82% 2,27% 2,43% 2,34% 2,30% 2,29%
Canada 2,01% 2,03% 2,00% 2,15% 2,15% 1,99%
China 2,31% 2,43% 2,80% 2,90% 3,00% 3,00%
Euro Area 1,23% 1,38% 1,50% 1,67% 1,77% 1,84%
Global 3,41% 3,56% 3,48% 3,45% 3,43% 3,42%
2018 2019 2020 2021
United States 3,89% 3,73% 3,53% 3,55%
Canada 5,83% 5,79% 6,00% 6,12%
China 3,80% 3,80% 3,80% 3,80%
Euro Area 8,20% 7,66% 7,47% 7,34%
Global 5,30% 5,20% 5,12% 5,10%
2017 2018 2019 2017 2018 2019
USA 101.20 101.07 101.11 USA 95.9 98.3 96.8
China 103.84 103.90 104.28 Canada 54.5 52.43 52.65
Euro Area 100.80 100.04 99.81 China 122.6 123 124.3















Exhibit 12: Total number of health clubs 
worldwide (in million) 
Exhibit 11: Private Consumption and House Holding Saving from 2017 to 2021 (%) 
This is based on a private consumption drop and on an increasing household 
saving ratio (Exhibit 11). The way in which Lululemon will oppose to this tendency is 
a critical factor for its expansion strategy success. 
 
 
3. Industry Overview 
Despite the timid growth presented in the previous chapter, the sportswear industry 
future seems considerably more promising. In the last couple of years, several 
factors have been identified as a plausible reason for the extraordinary performance 
that the Global Sportswear Industry is facing. Among these reasons are the 
internationalization, the popularity of sportswear as part of mainstream fashion and 
the new trend of health and wellness. All of these yielded great opportunities for 
sports and fashion brands. A good example of this was the rise in the number of 
sport clubs and gyms, which helps strengthen the concept of health as the new wealth 
and consequently the concept of sportswear as an important part of an active life 
(Exhibit 12).  
Whereas before it was incredibly dangerous to enter into the fashion industry because 
it could damage the credibility of the brand, nowadays, and as a result of the 
acceptance of sportswear as part of mainstream fashion, the industries are more 
connected than ever before. In fact, many premium brands that were only focused 
on casual apparel and footwear already started selling athletic clothes and shoes. 
Furthermore, due to the health and wellness trend people, started to construct their 
identities around fitness, so immediately spending money on apparel and footwear, 
and consequently, boosting the sales in the sportswear market. Indeed, nowadays, 
many people consider “health as the new wealth” and because of that they see 
premium athletic wear as a worthy investment. As a result, people started not only 
to acquire clothes for their needs from premium sportswear brands, but also to replace 
premium casual clothing for premium sportswear.  
This tendency to wear sports apparel daily (Exhibit 13), which already is socially 
acceptable and quite mature in regions such as North America and Western Europe, 
in Emerging markets is only gaining traction now. Considering both these new 
“The number tell the story: the 
health club industry continues 
to expand its presence around 
the globe and to serve more 
people every day. In 2017, 
health club membership 
topped 174 million consumers 
around the world” 
Source: Statista 
Source: OECD 


















Exhibit 14: Sportswear Industry CAGR (%) and 
Market Size 
Exhibit 15: Revenues (in $ million) and respective growth (%) from 2014 to 2018 
Exhibit 13: When do you wear sports? 
countries attraction and their large population, we can only believe that the market will 
not only keep its impressive/recent winning performance but also face a boost in its 
sales. In fact, from 2019 to 2023, Passport anticipates that Asia Pacific is going to 
be the region with highest CAGR (7.99%), followed by Europe and North America 
with 5.96% and 5.23%, respectively. 
All the reasons above mentioned help explain the remarkable industry growth. 
Considering the regions where Lululemon nowadays operates, the sports apparel 
market grew at a CAGR of 7.21% from 2014 to 2019, reaching an impressive amount 
of $228 billion. Similarly, it is estimated5 that it will reach $311 billion by 2023, 
registering a CARG of 6.2% from 2019 to 2023 (Exhibit 14). 
Lululemon already is a part of the sportswear industry, being able to establish a solid 
position in the market mainly due to its capacity to develop new and innovative 
products in the past few years. The effort that the company has done so far allowed 
Lululemon to increase its market share and confidence among customers. 
Moreover, the fact that global health and wellness are becoming key indicators of the 
living standard allowed Lululemon Athletica to boost its sales as customers more 
and more choose to wear sportswear in social environments based on their new 
comfort and fitness-centric mentality. Taking in consideration the aforementioned 
explanation and the expectation for the whole sportswear industry, we believe that 
Lululemon will continue to successfully take advantage of the current tendencies. 
3.1 Competition 
The rivalry on the sportswear industry has significantly increased in recent years 
and is now a highly competitive sector. Even though Nike and Adidas still stand apart, 
many new competitors have entered the market and are getting the most from the 
industry changes. One of the best examples of this is Under Armour, a recent player, 
who has been able to enter this business and to content with the two major brands 
that controlled the industry for a long time. However, despite the growth of the 
sportswear market in terms of players and competitiveness, new entrants still have 
room, as is proved by Lululemon. In fact, Lululemon CAGR from 2014 to 2018 
surpasses its biggest competitors CARG, and this can be quickly noted by glancing 
at Exhibit 15.  















When I go out


























2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 CAGR
Nike 30,601             32,376             34,350             36,397             39,117             6.33%
5.80% 6.10% 5.96% 7.47%
Adidas 14,534             16,915             18,483             21,218             21,915             10.81%
16.38% 9.27% 14.80% 3.28%
Under Armour 3,084                3,963                4,825                4,989                5,193                13.91%
28.50% 21.75% 3.40% 4.09%
Lululemon 1,797                2,060                2,344                2,649                3,288                16.30%












Exhibit 16: Nike vs Adidas Revenues growth 
from 2015 to 2018 (%) 
Exhibit 17: Lululemon vs Major Competitors 
Market Share 
With intense competition in the sportwear market and with Lululemon fighting to reach 
a place near the major brands – Nike, Adidas and Under Armour –, it is important to 
analyse how those players with considerable size are fighting back. 
Concerning Nike6, a look at the industry history immediately shows that Nike has been 
the dominating brand for a long time. However, this position is now under Adidas 
threat. In fact, if the growth tendency of Adidas and Nike remains unchanged, Nike 
will not be the top-ranking spotswear company anymore (Exhibit 16).  
Nowadays, about two-thirds of Nike total sales rely on footwear. Though, Nike’s CEO 
named clothing as “one of Nike’s greatest growth opportunities”. In this sense, Nike 
already launched a yoga collection for both women and men. This served as a 
warning signal for Lululemon as Nike is currently focused in penetrating the yoga 
niche, serving both men and women at a lower price than Lululemon does. 
However, Nike’s core business still is selling shoes and that is not expected to change 
in the near future, which is why we expect Lululemon to continue to do well. 
Moreover, Nike launch the “Nike Consumer Experience” which aims to improve the 
control over the brand image and to fortify the relation with customers. Interestingly, 
this same customer approach through digital technologies is being followed by 
Lululemon, who wants to take advantage of the growth that is facing the internet 
retail market. 
The information above illustrates how much Nike and Lululemon have in common, 
with similar digital strategies and ideas to expand their target customers. Although 
Nike has increased both the depth and breadth of its clothing portfolio to bring in new 
and more loyal clients, Lululemon has been able to gain market share (Exhibit 17). 
And if, a few years ago, Lululemon could be considered a small, niche company, 
nowadays, this can no longer be said. In fact, with the expansion of the portfolio 
beyond yoga and women, Lululemon is already fighting to overtake the main brands.  
Regarding Adidas7, as aforementioned, is one of the two biggest sportswear retailers 
in the world and is therefore perceived by us as one of Lulemon’s main competitors. 
Despite having faced a few bad years, with the recent change of its CEO, Adidas 
could be back on track and ready to challenge the comfortable top market spot of 
Nike.  
The tremendous progress that the company has faced lately can be partly explained 
by the success of its reinvigorated old school models. Knowing that nostalgia is a 
force to entice buyers, Adidas bet on the re-launching of old shoes, such as Stan 
Smith and Superstar, to caught the attention of shoppers, and was able to put the 
                                                 
6 Information from Nike Reports and Calls and CNBC news. 









































Exhibit 19: Under Armour vs Lululemon 
Revenues growth (%) from 2015 to 2018 
Exhibit 18: Crossfit Affiliates vs Reebok 
Revenues from 2008 to 2018 
spotlight that had been missing for a very long time back on the brand. Additionally, 
another significant strategic decision Adidas took was to acquire Reebok, a world-
renowned company that regulates CrossFit, a sport that is booming and growing 
exponentially since 2012. Thus, Reebok, as main Crossfit Games sponsor and 
partner, expected its sales to grow at a rate that goes hand in hand with the sport 
boom. However, the sales are not reflecting the same boom as the number of 
CrossFit followers (see exhibit 18). Despite the growth verified in the last few years, 
sales are still increasing at a slower rate than the sport itself. So, it can be assumed 
that Reebok does not take all the value from this sport, leaving an opening for 
Lululemon to expand in line with its strategy: men’s market and sports outside yoga.  
As stated above, notwithstanding Adidas growth over the last few years, Lululemon 
revenues are growing more rapidly. At this point, it is important to highlight that 
Lululemon's strength and creativity now lie outside its origins, converting 
Lululemon into an even more competitive brand against the athletic giants. On top 
of this, the company is being able to grow all over the world, with comparable sales 
growth of more than 50 percent in Asia last year for example. All these indicators 
show that Lululemon is a new player to consider, forcing the big retailers to take 
action if they want to keep their market share.  
Besides the two giants, there is Under Armour8,  a considerably younger top five 
player on the sportswear industry . After its foundation, Under Armour understood that 
they would have a long way to go in order to challenge the dominance of the big two. 
After some years stabilizing its status and increasing its market share, with growing 
sales and revenues year after year, now this impressive momentum seems to have 
come to an end. Looking at the last two years, it can be seen that Under Armour 
and Lululemon’s direction diverged. Under Armour revenues growth decreased, 
whereas Lululemon revenues rose retaining its position as the leading “best breed” of 
the booming athletic market (see exhibit 19). 
Apart from this, considering CEO Kevin Plank recent words, Under Armour does not 
want to diversify its business from traditional footwear and sportswear. He announced 
that the company desires to stick to performance products rather than penetrating 
the athleisure market. Since this strategy seems to make no sense nowadays, both 
sides of the market were studied to better understand the expectations (see exhibit 
20).  
The growth rates in the different sides of the market appear to be comparable, 
however, markets are fragmented differently and therefore there is difference 
between focusing on one side of the market (performance) or on the other (athleisure). 
                                                 
8 Information from Under Armour Reports and News 
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Exhibit 20: Expected Performance different 
market sides (%) 
Exhibit 21: Square Foot (thousands) and 
Growth Rate (%)  from 2014 to 2030 
For example, whereas the performance industry still depends a lot on celebrity 
partnerships, where Nike and Adidas are almost invincible, the athleisure business 
depends more on client’s loyalty to the brand, apparel creativity and to its pricing 
strategy. This is the reason why Lululemon generated double-digit growth in 
recent years, being able to make a clear distinction between fast fashion and active 
wear.  
In conclusion, it seems plausible to consider that there is a strong correlation between 
Under Armor’s hesitation to enter in the athleisure market and its perception that it 
would be difficult to beat the competition, mainly due to the pricing strength and 
customer’s loyalty to the brand. Under Armour is therefore focused on maximizing 
its market share on its core business.  
4. Segmentation Analysis 
Lululemon operates through three main channels: Company Operated Stores, Direct 
to Consumer and Others. 
4.1 Company Operated Stores  
 
In 2018, Company Operated Stores were responsible for more than 64,5% of 
Lululemon’s total sales, converting this channel the main source of net revenue.  With 
a 16% increase from the previous year, reaching a value of $2,1 billion, these stores 
are expected to lead the company’s expansion and growth strategy for the next years. 
At the end of year 2018, Lululemon counted with 440 stores mainly located in streets, 
lifestyle centres and in malls. This channel is especially important for those sectors of 
society that still do not like online shopping, and for those who, despite buying 
online, enjoy in-store experiences to try new pieces and styles.  
In order to strengthen the results of this segment, the firm includes a real estate plan 
in its growth strategy that aims not only to open new stores internationally, but also 
to increase their average square footage by a low double-digit through 2023. The 
objective is to open new types of stores, such as temporary pop-ups and huge 
stores up to 25,000-square-foot, that will enable the plan of co-locating - to have both 
men and women in the same place - and the plan to develop its new guest 
experience concept.  
 
“Customers want more 
than a simple transaction” 
Source:  Mordot Intelligence, Report Buyer, Research and 
Market 
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“… Companies must optimize 
store foot print and learn how 
to use online as an extension 
of the in-store experience or 
vice-versa…” 
 












Exhibit 23: Digital speed vs probability of 
bounce 
Exhibit 22: Sportswear Digital Sales and 
Lululemon Digital Sales CAGR from 2014 to 
2018 (%) 
In this sense, Lululemon has recognized that the future of in-store shopping will 
depend on its ability to offer a richer experience when the customer visits their 
physical stores. Otherwise, the retail segment would end up being cannibalized by 
the digital channel instead of reinforced by it.  
A good example of this approach is the newly opened Lululemon’s Chicago Store 
which counts with a restaurant area – managed by an outside party that pays a 
monthly rent –, a gym and a meditation studio, besides the retail space, 
constituting, thus, a prototype of what many predict as the store of the future.  
Finally, having a physical space where Lululemon brings together its community is 
essential to put in practise its omni guest experience pillar.  
4.2 Direct to Consumer 
Net revenue generated in 2018 by the Direct to Consumer segment was $858.6 
million, a further improvement over the $577.6 million generated in 2017. With this 
49% increase in revenue relative to the previous year, the segment reinforced its 
relevance for Lululemon’s results. Keeping in mind that the digital channel is an 
effective way to raise brand awareness and to enlarge company’s operating radius, 
the strategy considered for this segment will impact significantly Lululemon’s 
performance over the next years. Currently, the company operates through both its 
e-commerce website and mobile app, with country and region personalized pages. 
This customization is key to attract online buyers, who want an easy, quick and safe 
operation. Besides those customers, the segment is particularly important for young 
women, who enjoy scrolling through brand websites to check their products and share 
their opinion with other people. Combining this segment with the Company Operated 
Stores segment, most of society sectors are covered. In addition, there is also a “buy 
online pick up in store” functionality in all North American stores which gives the 
customer an alternative to experience both segments characteristics.  
Lululemon, in order to maintain the growth trend of this segment, is making large 
investments in digital marketing and advertising promotions9. As a result, digital 
interaction experienced an exponential increment since the 3rd quarter of 2018, 
with growth rates of 30% in website traffic and 80% in e-mail shopping. 
Furthermore, direct marketing-related traffic increased 60% and there was a 50% 
spike in transactions made by existing clients.  
However, the company can not only focus on marketing and advertising, since the 
efficiency of the digital channel is crucial as other brands have already 
demonstrated. The phenomenal performance of Lululemon’s competitors and peers 
                                                 
9 Lululemon CEO 
CAGR (2014-2018)
Lululemon Digital Sales 27.88%
Sportswear Digital Sales 24.63%
Source:  Passport and Company Data 
Source:  Google Study 
 
“In November, the 
company will open a new 
store in the 5th Avenue 
and its second 
experience store inside 
the Mall of America” 
 
By Lululemon’ CEO 
 
 








Exhibit 24: Other Channels Revenues (in 
thousands) and % of Total Sales from 2014 to 
2018  
have made customers intolerants to flaws. Hence, Lululemon must ensure high-
quality services both during and after sales. Therefore, the firm is also focused on 
creating a fast and unhindered online experience and making sure its content is 
frequently updated.  
Finally, this digital channel is also crucial to get rid of excess inventory. 
Lululemon has a section in its website called “We Made Too Much” where products 
are added at discount prices, creating a win-win solution for both the company and 
the client. 
4.3 Other Channels 
Other Channels’ segment increased its revenue to $301.1 million in 2018, which 
represents a growth of 29% from the previous year. With that result, this 
complementary segment accounted for 9,2% of total sales. This segment includes 
channels such as outlets and warehouses, temporary locations, wholesales and 
showrooms. Despite being the segment with the lowest representation, it plays an 
important role in Lululemon’s strategy since, besides being used to sell excess 
inventory at reduced prices, it is used to test geographies where the brand has no 
presence but intends to, and to prompt brand awareness in specific places.  
The segment also includes license and supply arrangements like the ones 
established with partners in locations such as the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, 
Qatar, Oman, Bahrain and Mexico, conceding them the right to operate Lululemon 
branded retail locations. Nonetheless, Lululemon preserves the right to sell through 
its website in those regions. 
Apart from that, also included in this segment, is the partnership established with 
Sephora during fiscal year 2019 to sell Lululemon’s recently launched beauty 
package, with which the company intends to enter the Active Beauty market. This 
partnership will enable the company to sell its product not only at Sephora’s 
website, but also at its stores. 
5. Strategy 
Lululemon designed a growth strategy for the next five years based on three pillars – 
product innovation, omni-guest experiences and international expansion –, that will 
be reflected to a greater or lesser extent in each segment growth plan. The strategy 
will be boosted by some key drivers, which may be a result of internal and external 
factors, that will define the success of it. Understanding the impact of those pillars and 
drivers is extremely important to properly forecast the company’s growth and assess 
its future valuation. For these reasons, the strategy will be presented pillar by pillar, 
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Exhibit 26: Participations in Sports by Gender 
in US from 2008 to 2018 (%) 
Exhibit 27: Total Revenues of global sports 
apparel market from 2014 to 2025 (in $ billion) 
Exhibit 25: Where do you normally exercise, 
work out or do sport? (%) – United States 
5.1 Product innovation 
Lululemon recognized that, in order to grow, it would be necessary to expand 
beyond its core business: yoga and women. For this reason, it became a priority 
to diversify its target market and the range of products it offers. Therefore, 
besides focusing on the company’s traditional women apparel, Lululemon expanded 
its scope by offering an athleisure portfolio and a high-performance line focused 
on strength training, running and some new categories. 
On one hand, the latter, despite being a line available for both genders, is seen by the 
company as a lure for bringing new male clients to its stores, since they usually are 
more attracted by these types of sports rather than yoga (see Exhibit 25). As a matter 
of fact, men are one of the drivers of Lululemon’s strategy. Currently, running and 
training items with anti-stink technology are the products that most attract men in 
Lululemon; they appreciate and are willing to pay a premium10 for clothes with 
technology that boost their performance. However, this high-performance line is 
also important for the female sector, which has been facing a massive growth (see 
Exhibit 26). Innovations such as the tank and the sport bra have increased comfort 
while exercising, improving women’s performance and wellness during and after 
training. In addition to the above, the firm is also trying to engage men into its yoga 
products, making the most of their increasing participation (see Exhibit 28). 
According to a survey conducted by Yoga Alliance and Yoga Journal, the number of 
American men doing yoga more than doubled between 2012 and 2016. 
On the other hand, the athleisure trend is a driver that allows sport companies such 
as Lululemon to sell its products outside its natural market. It could be considered 
the strongest trend11 in the industry at the moment, thanks to its recent acceptance 
and spread across most geographies and genders. Due to the improvement in 
materials and innovative designs, demand is estimated to further increase, 
creating an opportunity for companies to build a high-profitable business around this 
trend. Despite the fact that women are the origin of this movement by wearing yoga 
pants and other activewear outside of the sports areas, men are also a target sector 
for Lululemon in this subject. As Ayako Hommam, beauty and fashion consultant at 
Euromonitor International, refers, “there is an emerging key trend (athleisure) that 
changed men’s perception of fashion and its willingness to spend more time and 
money to improve its appearance”. 
By looking to Lululemon’s 2nd quarter results of 2019, the firm seems to be 
implementing its strategy with regard to the product innovation pillar very well. For 
                                                 
10 Euromonitor International 
11 The Wall Street Journal 
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…in a sports club 16% 8% 24%
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Exhibit 28: Yoga Participation in US by gender 
from 2012 to 2020 (in million) 
example, 30% of Lululemon’s new consumers were men, meaning a revenue’s 
growth in the men’s category of 35%.  
5.2 Omni-guest experiences 
In an era in which technology invites people to spend most of their time online, 
it is crucial to offer different and exciting experiences to customers in order to 
avoid depending too much on the digital channel. For this reason, the firm is 
developing a plan to offer a full experience to its customers both outside and inside 
its stores. Regarding the former, the company organizes several events with 
diverse natures such as the Annual SeaWheeze Half-marathon and Sunset Festival 
that seek to connect the community with Lululemon’s technical products and lifestyle. 
Concerning the inside experiences, as mentioned before, Lululemon is setting up 
huge dynamic stores where the customer will not only go shopping, but also 
participate in yoga or meditation sessions, have a meal or just enjoy a gym session. 
The best example of the impact that this pillar may have on Lululemon’s results is 
its aforementioned Chicago Store. Even being relatively recent, when compared with 
a traditional branch in the city, there are already some aspects that seem to prove 
that the new plan will succeed. Firstly, the experiential store is attracting 
customers at off-hours, meaning morning and evening periods. Secondly, the new 
store keeps customers 16%12 more time inside than the normal location, which 
is crucial to ensure a full experience. It is important to highlight that more time inside 
does not necessarily mean more time shopping, since that time could have been 
spent at the gym, meditating or just enjoying a meal. However, in the long-term, 
bringing customers to the store will end-up meaning, with a high probability, a 
raise in sales. 
5.3 International Expansion  
Lululemon expects to quadruple international revenues by 2023 based on two main 
premises: the number of stores outside North America will significantly increase 
(181%) and the potential of the digital channel will be fully exploited. Apart from 
this, the company intends to use the Beauty and Self Care business as a facilitator 
for entering new markets. 
The digital transformation is a critical driver of Lululemon’s worldwide growth 
mainly because it allows the company to interact more closely with customers 
that do not have a physical store nearby. Through its website and app, the firm is able 
to engage with online users, leading to a stronger brand connection and, as a 
consequence, additional sales. Furthermore, these platforms generate data that can 
be used to collect market trends in each region, which will then be used to develop 
                                                 
12 Lululemon Statement  
 
“The firm plans to launch 
new websites in France, 
Germany, Korea and Japan 
until then end of 2019” 
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Exhibit 29: Digital Sales vs Site Traffic vs Email 
List 2018 
Exhibit 30: Evolution of Stores in UK from 2015 
to 2019 
Exhibit 31: Number of Members in Health and 
Fitness in Europe from 2010 to 2017 (in 
millions) 
products adapted to those markets. The digital channel is also used to 
disseminate Lululemon’s marketing campaigns all around the world, increasing 
its web traffic and, as a result, its e-commerce revenues (Exhibit 29). An example of 
the success that Lululemon is facing with its digital channel is its ranking on the 
newly released Internet Retailer 2019 Top13, where the company is ranked number 
81. This makes us believe that the company will be able to fully exploit this channel 
as previously assumed.  
Regarding the opening of new stores in countries outside North America, two regions 
should be highlighted: Europe and China. Europe used to be an unexploited market. 
However, once successfully tested in the UK (Exhibit 30), the company designed a 
plan to expand its scope to other countries in the region. Knowing that it is a strong 
market that has already adhered to the athleisure trend and that its people care 
about their health and wellness, Lululemon found an opportunity to develop its 
business. China, another key driver, is a fast-growing market with its sportswear 
industry expected to expand at a compounded annual growth rate of 10.42%14 until 
2023. This driver is boosted by governmental reforms, such as the “2016-2020 National 
Fitness Plan”, whose main goal is to sustain the consistent growth of the sportswear 
market and to create a “moderately prosperous society”. It is important to highlight the 
fact that China presents a young nation, counting with approximately 400 million 
millennials15 which corresponds to more than the whole US population. Millennials 
became a key driver of China’s consumer and retail markets12 and are an 
appealing target for both performance and lifestyle sportswear. In addition, as in 
Europe, people are increasingly becoming more concerned about their health and 
wellness, which has led them to pursue an active lifestyle (Exhibit 31). This, together 
with Will’s Group interest in developing partnerships with sports accessories, athleisure 
clothing and health product’s brands, means an opportunity for Lululemon to expand 
there.  
6. Forecast 
To forecast Lululemon's cash flow, a set of inputs for the DCF Model were 
estimated. To do that, a set of assumptions, which will be presented later in this 
chapter, were made. 
6.1 Revenues 
The first step to build the DCF Model was to estimate Lululemon’s expected 
revenues, since a considerable number of all financial statements depend on those 
                                                 
13 Forbes 
14 Passport – Euromonitor International 
15 BBC News 
Q1 2018 Q2 2018 Q3 2018 FY 2018
Digital Sales 60% 47% 46% 48.7%
Site Traffic 40% 25% 30% 32%
Email List 110% 80% 90% 93%
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Exhibit 32: Total Revenues Forecast from 2019 
to 2030 (In $ Billions) 
Exhibit 33: Sales per Average Square Feet from 
2019 to 2030 (In $ Thousands) 
Exhibit 34: New Stores Per Year in Australasia 
and Canada from 2020 to 2030 
projections. Given that Lululemon is a fashion company, it is particularly 
challenging to value and predict future growth, as the sportswear industry depends 
heavily on fashion trends. It was therefore crucial to link the global economic 
indicators with their potential impact on the industry and on the company itself. 
Apart from the above, it is important to take into consideration that Lululemon’s net 
revenues usually present a seasonal pattern, with three almost flat first quarters and 
a strong last quarter. This behaviour has been considered during the estimation 
process, 2019 included, because, so far, the company only reported its results for the 
first three quarters. The fourth quarter end results will only be released in March 2020. 
To do the analysis, company sales were divided according to the segments in which 
the company operates: Company Operated Stores, Digital Sales and Other 
Channels. Included in this latter segment, the Beauty and Self Care business was 
studied thoroughly.  
Company Operated Stores 
To model this segment revenues in the future, Lululemon’s sales were forecasted 
based on the average square feet and the number of stores. During the last 5 years, 
sales per average square feet have been stable. For this reason, we assumed that 
the value will continue around the same level. Concerning the number of new stores, 
it will vary from region to region (Asia Pacific, Australasia, Canada, China, United 
States and Western Europe). To forecast the stores, it is important to consider both 
the estimated sportswear industry size (in nominal terms), and the impact that the 
value drivers will have on the demand. The evolution of the sportswear industry in 
nominal terms is particularly relevant because we found a correlation between the 
market size growth and the number of stores opened.  
Regarding Australasia and Canada, the rationale behind the evolution of the 
company in those regions is similar. During the last five years, the number of stores 
opened in these regions has been relatively stable, with a yearly growth a little lower 
than the overall sportswear industry growth. With Lululemon’s strategy to increase 
revenues through expanding its business to the men’s market and developing 
products to sports other than yoga, we believe that the company will continue opening 
new stores at a steady rhythm. Therefore, we determined the number of new stores 
in each year based on a rolling average of the previous three year’s ratio between the 
industry growth and the number of stores opened. As a result, from 2018 to 2030, we 
believe that the company will open 23 new stores in Canada and 28 new locations in 
Australasia, which represent, on average, two stores per year in each region. 
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Exhibit 35: Revenues from US Stores from 2018 
to 2030 (in $ billion) 
Exhibit 36: Evolution of Stores in Western 
Europe from 2018 to 2030 
Exhibit 37: China Sports Industry Value from 
2012 to 2022 (in $ billion) 
Exhibit 38: Stores Revenues Evolution from 
2018 to 2030 (in $ billion) 
to $648 million in 2030, and in Australasia will increase from $181 million in 2018 to 
$477 million in 2030. 
Concerning the United States of America, Lululemon’s home market, the number of 
stores has not stopped increasing, thus keeping this market as the top contributor to 
Lululemon’s performance. Following this tendency, we expect this region to continue 
leading the number of stores opened and, consequently, representing the biggest 
portion of Lululemon’s revenues in this segment. This hypothesis seems plausible   
not only because the buying power in the USA is higher compared to that of most of 
all other regions, but also because it is the company’s primary market. This means 
that it is the region where Lululemon will probably invest more, providing new 
experiences to its customers, enhancing the company’s status and power, and 
therefore forging closer and stronger links with the clients. Based on these 
assumptions, we projected the number of stores to grow from 285 in 2018 to 545 in 
2030. With the average square feet remaining constant, this growth represents an 
increase of approximately 80% in revenues coming from stores in the USA, 
reaching an amount of $4.06 billion in 2030.  
With regard to Western Europe, Lululemon’s market share loss from 0.46% in 2014 
to 0.30% in 2017 served as a wake-up call and trigger for action. It has been 
interpreted as a clear signal that the firm needed to strengthen its internationalization 
strategy. As a result, 10 stores spread all over Europe were opened between 2017 
and 2018, with the aim of recovering at least part of the lost market share. Since the 
strategy seems to be a winning tactic - in 2018 the market share increased to 0.36% 
-, we believe that the company will continue its expansion in Europe, counting a total 
of 92 new stores from 2019 to 2030. The goal is to more than quadruple Lululemon’s 
revenues over the next 10 years in this region to reach a total of $841 million in sales. 
Finally, the Asia Pacific and Greater China regions are two critical strategic targets, 
where we estimated the highest expansion growth rates. This assumption is based 
on two main reasons. On the one hand, the population of Asia is highly involved in 
sports like yoga, which is one of Lululemon’s strong points. On the other hand, the 
concern with health and fitness is now surging in the region, making people more 
aware and inevitably tempted to spend their money in sportswear apparel (Exhibit 36). 
As a matter of fact, some of Lululemon main competitors already started to expand to 
this region with really good performance. By looking more in detail to Greater China, 
Lululemon already announced first quarter sales growth of 70% and second quarter 
sales growth of more than 30%. In order to keep this tendency, Lululemon knows 
that it is mandatory to boost its presence in the region, resulting in a substantial 
increase in the number of stores. More precisely, we expect Lululemon to open more 
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Exhibit 39: Digital Sales Sportswear vs 
Lululemon CAGR (%) 
Exhibit 40: Lululemon Digital Sales Evolution 
from 2018 to 2030 (in $ million) 
Exhibit 41: Lululemon Digital Sales per Region 
(%) in 2030 
countries between 2019 and 2030. This massive investment in Asia should allow the 
company to increase its revenues from $171 million to $1.5 billion during this period.  
Digital Sales 
Lululemon pretends to use the power and currency of Internet to more than double 
the Digital Channel earnings by 2023. According to last year results, digital sales 
generated $858 million in revenue, representing a 48% increase compared to 2017 
and a four years CAGR of 27.88% (see Exhibit 39) 
To successfully forecast the revenues in this segment from 2018 to 2030, as in the 
previous one, a geographical division was made. However, unlike before, only four 
regions were considered: Australasia, United States, Canada and Remaining 
Countries. In all four regions, the Sportswear Internet Retailing has been 
increasing its share within the overall industry market, and this must be taken into 
consideration when forecasting future developments. 
The outlook for the segment varies from one region to another. In the United 
States, where Lululemon’s growth rate has been higher than the US Sportswear 
Internet Retailing market growth rate, the tendency is expected to continue, 
although with slight slowing, and to contribute to increased market share. This 
assumption is based on the fact that the company is doing an effort not only to 
improve the speed and quality of its website, but also to generate loyalty and 
retain customers from the new target market. These efforts should bring more 
people to buy through this channel. Consequently, revenues will increase from $690 
million in 2018 to $2.5 billion in 2030. In Canada, even after solving the website 
problems, the company has not been able to catch the attention of customers, 
and therefore continues to lose market share. More specifically, on average, the 
company grew 0.83 times the market during the last five years. Since there is no 
factor predicted to change this behaviour, we believe it will persist and the 
company sales from this region will continue to increase at a slower rate than the 
distribution channel. Nonetheless, with the importance that this channel is gaining, 
Lululemon’s revenues are expected to increase more than 250% by 2030, registering 
an amount of $467 million. Regarding Australasia, the Internet Retailing Channel 
is also gaining force, and Lululemon took advantage of it. Since the company launch 
of its first website in the region in 2016, the achieved results were very good, with 
the growth rate always surpassing the distribution channel growth. This example of 
Lululemon’s capacity to seize the opportunities offered by the Digital channel 
support our belief that the company will be able to more than quadruple its revenues, 
reaching an impressive value of $111 million in 2030. This is reinforced by that fact 
that Lululemon expects to launch new specific website designs for each country that 
should help bring new customers. Finally, in the rest of the world, an increase of 
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Exhibit 42: Lululemon Other Channels 
Revenues Evolution (in $ thousands) and % of 
Digital and Stores Sales from 2019 to 2030 
Exhibit 43: Beauty and Self Care Revenues 
Evolution from 2019 to 2030 (in $ thousands) 
$100 million in sales is expected during the next 10 years. This prevision takes into 
account that Lululemon just started to develop its website for most of these 
countries last year and that some of them not only are quite used to buy online, but 
also have a large population. For example, in China, company’s sales from this 
segment increased more than 200% in the first quarter of fiscal year 2019. 
Other Channels and Beauty 
As already stated, the Other Channels segment was mainly used by Lululemon to 
study possible regions in order to understand whether or not it makes sense to 
explore that particular place. Over the past five years, earnings from this segment 
represented between 7% to 9% of total sales (Exhibit 42). We believe that this 
percentage will remain the same in the future in what regards this particular purpose. 
On top of the above, Lululemon entered a new business during fiscal year 2019: 
Beauty and Self Care. In terms of sales forecast, since it is a new business for 
Lululemon, Sephora and TopShop were used as a proxy. The reasons behind this 
decision were the fact that Lululemon’s product will be sold in Sephora websites 
and stores, thus being probable to behave with direct correlation to Sephora 
products, and to the fact that TopShop is a fashion company that entered in the 
Beauty and Self Care business 10 years ago, reflecting better than any other 
company which are the main threats and opportunities to gain a spot in this 
market. Taking all these into account, we believe that for fiscal year 2019, revenues 
coming from beauty will account for 1% of total revenues and from then on, sales 
will moderately surpass the industry growth, therefore gaining market share in this 
industry. In other words, the company is expected to start with sales around $39 
million in 2019, and we estimate that in 2030 sales will reach an amount close to $71 
million. This value is a result of the predicted growth over the years, representing a 
CAGR from 2019 to 2030 of 5.65% 
Finally, if we bring all segments together, Lululemon’s sales growth in 2019 should 
be around 19%. Assuming that the company will be able to continue standing out 
among its competitors, thus being a consumer preference, and taking into account 
the revenues evolution presented in each segment, we expect Lululemon to 
represent 2.89% of the sportswear market where the company operates in 2030. This 
market share results in net revenues of $11.69 billion in 2030, thus having a CAGR 
during the forecasted period of 10.46%. 
6.2 CAPEX 
As mentioned before, Lululemon is currently involved in a worldwide expansion 
strategy, aiming to achieve a top spot in the sportswear market. With such ambition, 
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“The partnership with 
Sephora extends lululemon's 
ability to reach new guests 
while partnering with an 
authority in the personal care 
space.” 
 
Investor Relations Lululemon 
 
 








Nevertheless, the company is expected to continue generating a large amount of 
cash flow from operating activities that could be used to finance part of the growth 
strategy.   
Regarding the payback of these investments, it has been estimated that 5% to 7%  
of Lululemon's sales over the last five years were a direct result of them. This pattern 
is projected to remain the same at least for the internationalization period. The high 
CAPEX level required is mainly due to the construction of new stores, the 
renovation and relocation of the current ones, and the investment in digital 
technology and marketing. Based on the strategy presented before, we expect this 
investment level to remain high during the forecasted period. 
6.3 Gross Margin   
Another important factor that distinguishes Lululemon from its main competitors is 
its Gross Margin (Exhibit 45). It is important to notice that the company has different 
gross margins depending on the segment. Specifically, in 2018, the Digital Segment 
presented the highest gross margin (65%), whereas both Company Operated Stores 
and Other Channels registered a gross margin of 56%. Combining the three over the 
past five years, an average gross margin of 53.34% is obtained, which exceeds the 
margins of Lululemon’s main competitors. Furthermore, its gross margin was below 
50% just once in these last five years.   
Yet, in spite of the above, Lululemon’s gross margin is not directly comparable to 
Nike’s, Adidas’ or Under Armour’s, because while most of Lululemon’s revenues 
come from selling high-priced products, its competitors also sell a considerable 
number of low-priced items. All this makes us believe that the robust gross margin 
presented until now is sustainable and is likely to continue in the coming years.  
In order to keep its high gross margin, Lululemon has to apply its premium pricing 
model to its extended product mix. For this reason, we assumed that most items 
developed to cover men’s wear and other sports will have a similar target price to the 
one of existing products. On top of that, Lululemon is strategically opening new 
factories with a Development Department and whitespace research, both focused in 
lowering product’s costs while designing high-quality clothes. We think that by 
offering only high-quality clothes, the company preserves its brand reputation and 
therefore its customers loyalty. In fact, the results since 2018 show that Lululemon’s 
popularity and market penetration is solid and promising.   
For all the reasons above mentioned, we estimate a practically unchanged gross 
margin (around 55%) over the next ten years. 
 
Exhibit 44: CAPEX and Depreciation from 2014 



















2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030
Capex Depreciation Capex % of Sales
Source: Analyst Estimates 
Gross Margin 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Current
Lululemon 46,89% 50,33% 54,17% 56,26% 57,27% 55,13%
Nike 45,92% 45,93% 44,47% 43,83% 45,15% 44,01%
Adidas 44,90% 47,18% 49,47% 51,68% 52,21% 52,09%
Under Armour 49,85% 47,98% 45,06% 43,35% 44,98% 48,26%
Exhibit 45: Lululemon Vs Main Competitors 
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6.4 Return On Invested Capital (ROIC) 
Currently, Lululemon has a leading position in yoga and athleisure apparel for 
women in United States and Canada, and despite the competitiveness of the industry, 
the company has been able to grow at double-digit rates for the past five years. This 
is partially explained by the firm’s competitive advantage over most other brands, as 
shown by its average annual ROIC16 that averaged 45% over the past 5 years.  
Nonetheless, it is not clear whether Lululemon will be capable of maintaining its 
dominance indefinitely. It is probable that its strongest competitors will readjust their 
strategy in order to protect their market position. Despite this fact, considering all the 
information available and already presented in this report, we consider that there are 
solid evidences that Lululemon will continue to gain market share at the expense 
of its competitors in the coming years.  
Based on the above, we projected Lululemon’s average annual ROIC to exceed its 
weighted average cost of capital over the next 10 years, supporting our belief that 
Lululemon will be able to preserve its competitive advantage. We projected the 






7.1 Discounted Cash Flow Model 
To financially evaluate Lululemon, the Discounted Cash Flow Model was used. This 
method is widely recognised as the most accurate approach to value a high-growth 
company, and thus it seemed the best option to simulate Lululemon's results based 
on its core growth drivers.                                    
                                                 
16 Lululemon’ ROIC was calculated dividing NOPLAT of the current year by Invested Capital from previous year 
Lululemon 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 2025F 2026F 2027F 2028F 2029F 2030F
ROIC 81,0% 39,1% 35,2% 32,5% 30,3% 27,0% 26,7% 26,6% 26,6% 27,0% 27,5% 28,2%
IR 218,89% 78,63% 59,29% 54,77% 43,94% 27,72% 29,95% 26,71% 22,70% 19,87% 17,02% 14,74%
















Exhibit 46: Lululemon Estimated ROIC and IR 
(%) from 2020 to 2030 
Source: Analyst Estimations 
Exhibit 47: Lululemon Estimated ROIC, IR and Growth (%) from 2029 to 2030 
Source: Analyst Estimations 
Exhibit 48: Discounted Cash flow Model Inputs 
Operating Enterprise Value 34 636 052$  
Non Operating Enterprise Value 1 259 688$    
Debt 1 085 634$    
Equity Value 32 290 731$  
Perpetual Growth 4,12%
WACC 6,40%
 Nº of Sahres Outstanding (Million) 123 330$       
Share Price 260,10$         
DCF Inputs
Source: Analyst Estimations 
 
 








Besides the 4th quarter of 2019, a total of 10 periods were forecasted, from 2020 
until 2030. After that period, the terminal value was computed since the company is 
expected to be mature in 2030. Moreover, given that long-term projections are highly 
uncertain, and even more so in high-growth companies, a scenario analysis has been 
made. This will be further explained in the Scenario Analysis chapter. 
  
 
Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC)  
In order to evaluate and measure Lululemon’s business competitiveness, the cost of 
capital was computed. The firm’s cost of capital, known as weighted average cost 
of capital (WACC), takes into consideration both the cost of equity and the cost of 
debt with their correspondent weights. 
On the one hand, in what regards the cost of debt, Lululemon’s whole debt value is 
based on leases, and this nature is not expected to change in the coming years. 
Hence, for the cost of debt, a value of 3.75%, corresponding to the weighted average 
cost used by the company to discount the future lease payments and to assess its 
current debt, was assumed. Nonetheless, since this nature of debt is unusual in the 
sportswear industry, a second methodology was used. In this approach, the cost of 
debt equals the risk-free plus the default spread. To calculate the default spread, the 
interest coverage ratio, which is commonly used as an auxiliary to estimate credit 
ratings, was employed. A synthetic credit rating of AAA was achieved, corresponding 
to a default spread of 0.75%. Based on this value and assuming that the risk-free is 
1.82%, an estimated cost of debt of 2.57% was obtained.  
On the other hand, the cost of equity was given by the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM). In order to compute the CAPM, the Market Risk Premium (MRP), the risk-
free rate and the beta values were needed. For the risk-free, as used before, the 
current 10 year US Treasury Bond yield was considered (1.82%). For the MRP, the 
value assumed was 5.5% based on Mckinsey’ book recommendation. As for the beta, 
two different methods were used. In the first one, the beta was calculated correlating 
Exhibit 50: Weighted Average Cost of Capital 




















Exhibit 49: Lululemon Operating Free Cash Flow from 2019 to 2030 (in $ million) 





Cost of Debt 3,75%






Source: Analyst Estimations 
 
 








the excess return of Lululemon and the excess return of the Standard & Poor’s 500 
(S&P 500) of the past five years with a linear regression. A raw beta of 0.843 was 
obtained (see Exhibit 51). In the second one, a peer-related research was carried out 
to estimate Lululemon’s beta. It was done by deriving an unlevered industry beta and 
then relevering the industry beta to the company’s target capital structure. In this way, 
we firstly obtained the levered of each peer. After that, the Blume adjustment17 was 
done in order to smooth raw betas. In third place, and since a comparison between 
firm’s leveraged betas would require the same capital structure and it was not the 
case, comparable firm’s unlevered betas were calculated. The next step was to 
determine the average unlevered beta using each company's obtained betas. Finally, 
Lululemon’s relevered beta was estimated obtaining a value of 0.819 (see Exhibit 
52), which is  very similar to its 0.843 levered beta obtained before.  
 
In view of the above, and since both betas are very similar, a decision to use the raw 
beta to compute Lululemon’s cost of equity was taken. Additionally, Lululemon’s 
target capital structure ratio was determined, assuming a target debt to equity ratio 
similar to the one of its peers. As a result, by doing an average between its peers, a 
target debt to equity ratio of 1.82% was projected, which is slightly lower (2.94%) 
than the current value. 
Terminal Growth Rate 
As above mentioned, we belive that Lululemon will mature in 2030. Consequently, 
longer-term growth rates are not expected to be as high as in the previous years. So, 
in order to make sure that the firm’s valuation does not increase at a higher rate than 
the economy, we computed the Terminal Growth Rate taking into consideration the 
real GDP estimated for all regions where Lululemon operates. In other words, a 
weighted average of the real GDP of each region considered in this study was 
calculated and then the US projected inflation was added (Exhibit 53). The weighted 
                                                 
17 The Blume Adjustement = 1/3*Market Beta + 2/3 Company Beta 
Exhibit 51: Linear Regression Lululemon vs 
S&P500  









-10% -8% -6% -4% -2% 0% 2% 4% 6% 8%
Source: Reuters and Analyst Calculation 
Companies Ticker Market Cap Total Net Debt Net Debt/ Equity MV Total Debt / Equity Adjusted Beta Unlevered Beta
LULULEMON ATH LULU US Equity 29 970 434 508            881 320 000-            0,029-                          0,420                       0,896                                 0,923                   
ADIDAS AG ADS GR Equity 58 206 738 604            1 192 000 000-         0,020-                          0,280                       0,803                                 0,820                   
UNDER ARMOUR-A UAA US Equity 9 182 466 688             171 431 000            0,019                          0,360                       0,666                                 0,653                   
NIKE INC -CL B NKE US Equity 158 556 085 463          1 184 000 000-         0,007-                          0,740                       0,906                                 0,913                   
PUMA SE PUM GR Equity 10 355 691 025            300 300 000-            0,029-                          0,530                       0,663                                 0,683                   
MONCLER SPA MONC IM Equity 10 900 135 685            450 109 000-            0,041-                          0,362                       0,798                                 0,832                   
Low 0,041-                          0,280                       0,663                                 0,653                   
Average 0,018-                          0,449                       0,789                                 0,804                   
Median 0,025-                          0,391                       0,801                                 0,826                   
High 0,019                          0,740                       0,906                                 0,923                   
Adjusted Relevered Beta 0,819                    
Exhibit 52: Beta Calculation using Comparables 
Source: Analyst Calculations 
 
 








average was calculated based on the expected number of stores that each region will 
have in 2030. A Terminal Growth Rate of 4.12% was obtained.  
 
Nonethless, when assuming a perpetual growth, the level of Return on Invested 
Capital (ROIC) should also be considered, since this level has to be constant in order 
to be pleausible to assume a terminal growth. As a matter of fact, the forecasted ROIC 
level is stable from 2024 onwards (Exhibit 47), thus it is safe to assume that the Free 
Cash Flow in 2034 will be perpetual. 
Valuation Outcome – Base Scenario 
Finally, considering the 10 years forecasted period followed by perpetuity from 2030 
onwards, with a WACC of 6.40% and a Terminal Growth rate of 4.12%, the DFC 
Model gives a share price value for the base scenario of $261.82 for fiscal year end 
2020.  
7.2 Multiples Valuation 
Besides the DCF Model, a second method was used to estimate Lululemon’s 
performance. In this chapter, we are going to evaluate the company through the 
Multiples Approach, which allows for better understanding the market perception 
on Lululemon’s value in comparison with other companies from the sportswear 
industry. 
Peer Companies 
Before moving on to Lululemon’s multiples valuation, it is important to analyse the 
financial health of its most direct peers. For this study, in addition to the companies 
previously described in the competition section (Nike, Adidas and Under Armour), 
we analysed the trading multiples for Puma and Monclear SPA.  However, due to the 
differences between both and Lululemon in the growth projections for the near future 
and in their multiple’s analysis, we decided not to include them in the final analysis. 
Regarding the remaining, it is important to notice that Nike, Adidas and Under 
Armour not only are, together with Lululemon, the sportswear companies selling 
their products at higher prices, but also have similar strategies to the one presented 
previously in this report. Therefore, the four of them can be considered premium 
Exhibit 53: Nominal GDP Growth and Terminal Growth Value  
 
Number of Stores 2030 Real GDP Growth 2030 Inflation 2030 Weight
US 545 1,4% 2,0% 54,0%
Canada 87 1,5% 8,6%
Western Europe 113 1,3% 11,2%
Asia Pacific 60 4,5% 5,9%
China 140 4,6% 13,9%
Australasia 64 2,2% 6,3%
Total   1009
Real GDP growth 2,08%
Nominal GDP Growth 4,12%
Terminal Growth 4,12%
Source: Passport – Euromonitor International and Analyst Calculations 
 
 








companies which are currently fighting locally and globally to gain market share and 
increase their revenues. Thus, with very similar business units, structures, and 
strategies, an overall picture of how the market is looking at premium sportswear 
is given with this analysis.  
Multiples Results 
To evaluate Lululemon we used the Enterprise Value to EBIT (EV/EBIT) and the 
Price to Earnings Per Share (P/EPS) ratios. Regarding the first, Nike is the one that 
presented the closest value to Lululemon’s 27.84x EV/EBIT current ratio. However, 
after computing a simple average of the EV/EBIT ratio for the chosen peers, we got 
a multiple of 29.58x, which implied a share price for Lululemon of $228,83. This result 
means that Lululemon is overvalued, which goes against our valuation through the 
DCF Model.  It is important to highlight, though, that   one of the lacunas of this multiple 
is that it only analyses the company from a static perspective, not considering neither 
the expected growth, nor the outcomes of it.  
Concerning the P/EPS ratio, Lululemon presented a multiple of 47.95x, which was 
the second highest just below the multiple presented by Under Armour (64.47x). As 
we did for the previous ratio, we computed a simple average of the P/EPS for the 
chosen companies, obtaining a multiple value of 45.20x, which implied that Lululemon 
share price was $253.45. This outcome is not only much more like the one achieved 
with our DCF valuation, but also is in line with the prognostic of Lululemon being 
undervalued. One possible explanation for these two opposite results is the above-
mentioned fact that, whereas the EV/EBIT does not consider the expected growth, 
the P/EPS does. 
8. Scenario Analysis  
Taking into consideration that the previously described assumptions and risks affect 
the results of our model, we decided to analyze three different scenarios, estimating 
their likelihood of occurrence. As a result, there is the best-case scenario, the worst-
case scenario and the base case scenario.  
Our Discounted Cash Flow Model is based on the base case scenario since we 
believe it has the highest probability of occurrence (80%). In this scenario, it was 
assumed that the company is able to achieve its goal of more than doubling the 
digital sales during the next five years, increasing from $859 Million in 2018 to $1.72 
Billion in 2023. Apart from that, in this scenario, we assumed that by expanding its 
business to other regions with high purchasing power and large population, such as 
China and Western Europe, Lululemon will be able to more than double its number of 
stores, and therefore to gain market share. Consequently, its total sportswear 
market share where the company operates will increase from 1.44% to 2.89% over 
Companies EV to EBIT P/E
LULULEMON ATH 27,84x 47,95x
ADIDAS AG 14,17x 32,83x
UNDER ARMOUR-A 51,21x 64,47x



















the next teen years. As a result of these assumptions, the scenario gives us a share 
price for fiscal year ended 2020 of $261.82, representing a total shareholder return of 
12.17%. 
Regarding our worst case scenario, we believe that its likelihood of occurrence is 
only of 10%. In this case, as the name suggests, we assumed what we considered to 
be the worst situation that the company could face. In what regards digital sales, the 
company will not even be able to double the sales, missing this target by $13 
million. It might happen if, for example, the company faces a substantial problem with 
its website adaptation to the different countries. Furthermore, this scenario assumes 
that Lululemon will face strong entry barriers, therefore missing the opportunity to 
increase sales globally at the pace that the company would expect. Consequently, its 
sportswear market share will only rise to 2.33%. In addition, in this hypothesis, we 
assumed that the company will need more capex than initially projected due to the 
unexpected entry barriers. As a result, a share price for fiscal year end 2019 of 
$212.64 is projected, representing a negative total shareholder return of 8.90%. 
Finally, we considered a best-case scenario, to which we assigned a 10% probability 
of occurrence. This scenario puts the company in line with the previous quarters, 
where it presented impressive results. With this assumption, Lululemon, as in the 
base scenario, is expected to more than double its digital sales, reaching $1.75 
Billion in revenues just from the digital segment. In this scenario we assumed that 
Lululemon will be able to caugh customers attention from Canada, with sales 
growth rate that surprasses the expected market growth, ant therefore regain the 
market share lost in Internet Retailing. Besides, in our best-case scenario, the 
company is able to spread its business to China and Western Europe as it does in the 
base case scenario.  All of this will lead to an increase in Lululemon’s total sportwear 
market share from 1.44% to 3.11%. Notwithstanding its ambitious nature, we truly 
believe that this is an achievable situation, as proven by the most recent quarters. As 
a result, this scenario gives us a share price for fiscal year ended 2019 of $293.75, 
representing a total shareholder return of 25,85% 
The above-mentioned scenarios were computed with the perpetual growth rate of 
4.12%. Combining all scenarios with their respective likelihoods, we get an expected 
target price of 260.10$, representing, a total shareholder return of 11.43%.  
 
 
Exhibit 55: Scenario Analysis  
Source: Company Data and Analyst Estimations 
Perpetuity Growth= 4.12% Probability Digital Sales in 2018 Digital Sales in 2023 Number of Stores 2030 Price Shareholder Return Recommendation
Worst Scenario 10,0% 858 856                     1 704 406                  795 212,64 -8,90% SELL
Base Scenario 80,0% 858 856                     1 722 211                  1009 261,82 12,17% BUY
Best Scenario 10,0% 858 856                     1 950 983                  1009 293,75 25,85% BUY
Expected Share Price 260,10 11,43% BUY
Current Share Price 233,42
 
 








9. Sensitivity Analysis 
Considering that the outcomes obtained in our Valuation Model were defined, to a 
large extent, by the assumptions we made, and that some of them are unpredictable 
and therefore have a high level of uncertainty, we decided to test the results. 
For this purpose, we computed a sensitivity analysis of the target price depending on 
the WACC and the growth rate. As previously explained, the cost of debt and the beta, 
which are essential WACC inputs, were calculated throught two different methods 
each. Therefore, in order to define the WACC interval to be considered, a combination 
of the rolling beta (0.843) and the relevered beta (0.819) with the two different costs 
of debt obtained was made. Consequently, we have four different possible WACC 
values (see exhibit 56).  
Regarding growth, it is doubtful and volatile but, as is well known, Lululemon long-
term growth is not forecasted to rise at levels higher than economic growth, 
particularly if the company matures as expected over the years. In view of this, it was 
decided to set an interval that not only includes the perpetual growth assumed in our 
Discounted Cash Flow Model (4.12%) but also the average growth of our main 
competitor (3.97%).  
From this analysis one can perceive that the target price is very sensitive to changes 
on both premises, ranging from $206.87 to $327.12 a share. Nonetheless, most of the 
collected values do not alter our opinion. 
Exhibit 56: Estimated possible WACC  
Exhibit 57: Sensitivity Analysis Result 
3,87% 3,92% 3,97% 4,02% 4,07% 4,12% 4,17% 4,22% 4,27% 4,32% 4,37%
5,98% 327,12 327,12 327,12 327,12 327,12 327,12 327,12 327,12 327,12 327,12 327,12
6,08% 308,54 308,54 308,54 308,54 308,54 308,54 308,54 308,54 308,54 308,54 308,54
6,18% 291,78 291,78 291,78 291,78 291,78 291,78 291,78 291,78 291,78 291,78 291,78
6,28% 276,57 276,57 276,57 276,57 276,57 276,57 276,57 276,57 276,57 276,57 276,57
6,38% 262,72 262,72 262,72 262,72 262,72 262,72 262,72 262,72 262,72 262,72 262,72
6,40% 260,10 260,10 260,10 260,10 260,10 260,10 260,10 260,10 260,10 260,10 260,10
6,50% 247,65 247,65 247,65 247,65 247,65 247,65 247,65 247,65 247,65 247,65 247,65
6,60% 236,21 236,21 236,21 236,21 236,21 236,21 236,21 236,21 236,21 236,21 236,21
6,70% 225,67 225,67 225,67 225,67 225,67 225,67 225,67 225,67 225,67 225,67 225,67
6,80% 215,91 215,91 215,91 215,91 215,91 215,91 215,91 215,91 215,91 215,91 215,91






Cost of Debt 3,75%
Beta 0,843
Wacc 6,40%
Cost of Debt 2,57%
Beta 0,843
Wacc 6,38%
Cost of Debt 3,75%
Beta 0,819
Wacc 6,26%
Cost of Debt 2,57%
Beta 0,819
Wacc 6,25%
Source: Analyst Estimation 
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All values in $ million. 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 2025F 2026F 2027F 2028F 2029F 2030F
Net Revenues
Company-operated stores 1 348$ 1 516$ 1 704$  1 837$  2 126$  2 527$  3 453$  4 120$  4 674$  5 212$  5 324$  5 639$  6 017$  6 374$  6 749$   7 128$   7 513$   
Direct to consumer 321$    402$    453$     578$     859$     1 002$  1 159$  1 338$  1 527$  1 722$  1 857$  2 060$  2 270$  2 493$  2 725$   2 967$   3 219$   
Other Channels 128$    143$    187$     235$     303$     347$     367$     444$     519$     579$     589$     636$     688$     734$     783$      836$      889$      
Beauty -$     -$     -$      -$      -$      39$       43$       46$       49$       52$       55$       58$       58$       61$       64$        68$        71$        
Revenues 1 797$ 2 061$ 2 344$  2 649$  3 288$  3 914$  5 023$  5 948$  6 769$  7 566$  7 826$  8 394$  9 033$  9 663$  10 322$ 10 998$ 11 691$ 
Cost of Goods Sold without D&A (825)$   (990)$   (1 057)$ (1 142)$ (1 350)$ (1 677)$ (2 162)$ (2 562)$ (2 916)$ (3 258)$ (3 363)$ (3 602)$ (3 872)$ (4 137)$ (4 414)$  (4 699)$  (4 989)$  
Selling, General and Administrative Expenses (538)$   (628)$   (778)$    (899)$    (1 110)$ (1 403)$ (1 738)$ (2 059)$ (2 343)$ (2 619)$ (2 706)$ (2 900)$ (3 120)$ (3 335)$ (3 561)$  (3 792)$  (4 029)$  
Restructuring Costs -$     -$     -$      (43)$      -$      -$      (7)$        -$      -$      -$      -$      -$      -$      -$      -$       -$       -$       
EBITDA 434$    442$    509$     564$     828$     835$     1 117$  1 326$  1 510$  1 689$  1 756$  1 891$  2 041$  2 191$  2 347$   2 508$   2 673$   
Depreciation (57)$     (73)$     (87)$      (108)$    (122)$    (123)$    (169)$    (208)$    (259)$    (315)$    (367)$    (414)$    (454)$    (489)$    (519)$     (544)$     (565)$     
EBITA 377$    370$    422$     456$     706$     712$     947$     1 119$  1 251$  1 374$  1 389$  1 477$  1 587$  1 702$  1 828$   1 964$   2 108$   
Amortization (1)$       (1)$       (1)$        (0)$        (0)$        -$      -$      -$      -$      -$      -$      -$      -$      -$      -$       -$       -$       
Operating Profit 376$    369$    421$     456$     706$     712$     947$     1 119$  1 251$  1 374$  1 389$  1 477$  1 587$  1 702$  1 828$   1 964$   2 108$   
Other Expense, Net 7$        (1)$       2$         4$         9$         10$       12$       15$       17$       19$       20$       21$       22$       24$       26$        27$        29$        
EBIT 383$    368$    423$     460$     715$     722$     959$     1 134$  1 268$  1 393$  1 409$  1 498$  1 609$  1 726$  1 854$   1 991$   2 137$   
Taxex (144)$   (102)$   (119)$    (201)$    (231)$    (205)$    (268)$    (320)$    (359)$    (394)$    (398)$    (423)$    (455)$    (488)$    (524)$     (563)$     (604)$     
Net Income Available to Investors 239$    266$    303$     259$     484$     518$     691$     814$     909$     999$     1 011$  1 074$  1 154$  1 238$  1 330$   1 428$   1 533$   
Foreign Currency Translation Adjustment (105)$   (65)$     37$       59$       (74)$      (23)$      (23)$      (23)$      (23)$      (23)$      (23)$      (23)$      (23)$      (23)$      (23)$       (23)$       (23)$       
COMPREHENSIVE INCOME 134$    201$    340$     317$     410$     495$     668$     791$     886$     976$     988$     1 051$  1 131$  1 215$  1 307$   1 406$   1 510$   
Comprehensive Income attributable to shareholders 134$    201$    340$     317$     410$     495$     668$     791$     886$     976$     988$     1 051$  1 131$  1 215$  1 307$   1 406$   1 510$   
Free Cash Flow Map ($ million)
All values in $ thousands. 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 2025F 2026F 2027F 2028F 2029F 2030F
Operating E Non Operating Cash Flow
NOPLAT 260$    292$    315$     508$     510$     683$     803$     897$     986$     997$     1 059$  1 138$  1 221$  1 311$  1 409$   1 512$   
Depreciation 73$      87$      108$     122$     123$     169$     208$     259$     315$     367$     414$     454$     489$     519$     544$      565$      
Gross Cash Flow 333$    379$    423$     631$     633$     852$     1 011$  1 156$  1 301$  1 364$  1 474$  1 593$  1 710$  1 830$  1 953$   2 077$   
Change in operating working capital (60)$     (3)$       17$       88$       (49)$      (43)$      (41)$      (46)$      (36)$      (24)$      (30)$      (28)$      (27)$      (25)$      (24)$       (23)$       
Right to use leases -$     -$     -$      -$      (137)$    (250)$    (199)$    (186)$    (151)$    (35)$      (99)$      (112)$    (109)$    (114)$    (114)$     (117)$     
Net capital expenditures (126)$   (161)$   (158)$    (216)$    (325)$    (354)$    (441)$    (514)$    (556)$    (583)$    (598)$    (614)$    (625)$    (634)$    (640)$     (642)$     
Increase (decrease) in other non-current assets (4)$       (10)$     (11)$      (6)$        (4)$        (15)$      (9)$        (9)$        (10)$      (2)$        (6)$        (7)$        (7)$        (7)$        (8)$         (8)$         
Decrease (increase) in other current liabilities (10)$     1$        7$         3$         0$         4$         6$         3$         3$         2$         1$         2$         2$         1$         1$          1$          
Decrease (increase) in other non-current liabilities 7$        (2)$       11$       23$       (78)$      -$      -$      -$      -$      -$      -$      -$      -$      -$      -$       -$       
Decrease (increase) income tax payable -$     -$     48$       (6)$        6$         (48)$      -$      -$      -$      -$      -$      -$      -$      -$      -$       -$       
Increase (decrease) in accumulated other comprehensive income (65)$     37$      59$       (74)$      (23)$      (23)$      (23)$      (23)$      (23)$      (23)$      (23)$      (23)$      (23)$      (23)$      (23)$       (23)$       
Free Cash Flow before Goodwill 76$      240$    397$     442$     23$       123$     304$     383$     530$     697$     719$     811$     921$     1 028$  1 146$   1 267$   
Investment in goodwil and acquired intagibles 1$        0$        (0)$        0$         -$      -$      -$      -$      -$      -$      -$      -$      -$      -$      -$       -$       
Total Free Cash Flow Available to Investor 77$      241$    396$     443$     23$       123$     304$     383$     530$     697$     719$     811$     921$     1 028$  1 146$   1 267$   
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Reformulated Balance Sheet ( $ million)
Uses 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 2025F 2026F 2027F 2028F 2029F 2030F
Current Assets
Operating cash 42$      49$      55$       62$       78$       92$       118$     140$     160$     178$     185$     198$     213$     228$     243$      259$      276$      
Accounts Receivable 14$      13$      9$         19$       36$       24$       33$       42$       45$       51$       53$       56$       61$       65$       70$        74$        79$        
Inventories 208$    284$    298$     330$     405$     453$     585$     695$     798$     897$     936$     1 009$  1 086$  1 162$  1 239$   1 316$   1 395$   
Prepaid and receivable income taxes 41$      91$      81$       49$       49$       62$       81$       101$     112$     125$     130$     139$     149$     160$     171$      182$      194$      
Other prepaid expenses and other current assets 24$      27$      39$       40$       57$       43$       43$       43$       43$       43$       43$       43$       43$       43$       43$        43$        43$        
Operating Current Assets 329$    464$    483$     500$     625$     675$     861$     1 021$  1 157$  1 295$  1 348$  1 445$  1 553$  1 658$  1 765$   1 875$   1 986$   
Current Liabilities
Accounts payable (9)$       (10)$     (25)$      (25)$      (96)$      (73)$      (95)$      (113)$    (130)$    (146)$    (152)$    (164)$    (177)$    (189)$    (201)$     (214)$     (227)$     
Accrued inventory liabilities (22)$     (25)$     (9)$        (13)$      (16)$      (18)$      (24)$      (28)$      (32)$      (36)$      (37)$      (40)$      (43)$      (46)$      (49)$       (52)$       (55)$       
Accrued compensation and related expenses (30)$     (44)$     (55)$      (70)$      (109)$    (109)$    (146)$    (179)$    (196)$    (222)$    (231)$    (246)$    (265)$    (284)$    (303)$     (323)$     (343)$     
Current income taxes payable (20)$     (38)$     (30)$      (16)$      (67)$      (58)$      (76)$      (88)$      (99)$      (107)$    (105)$    (111)$    (120)$    (128)$    (139)$     (150)$     (163)$     
Unredeemed Gift Card Liability (46)$     (58)$     (70)$      (83)$      (99)$      (119)$    (154)$    (181)$    (207)$    (231)$    (239)$    (256)$    (276)$    (295)$    (315)$     (336)$     (357)$     
Other Current Liabilities (14)$     (43)$     (44)$      (61)$      (93)$      (104)$    (128)$    (154)$    (171)$    (194)$    (201)$    (215)$    (232)$    (249)$    (266)$     (284)$     (302)$     
Operating Current Liabilities (142)$   (217)$   (233)$    (268)$    (481)$    (482)$    (624)$    (743)$    (834)$    (936)$    (965)$    (1 032)$ (1 112)$ (1 190)$ (1 273)$  (1 359)$  (1 447)$  
Operating Working Capital 187$    247$    250$     233$     144$     193$     236$     278$     323$     359$     383$     413$     441$     467$     493$      516$      539$      
PPE, Net 296$    350$    423$     474$     567$     770$     954$     1 188$  1 442$  1 683$  1 899$  2 083$  2 242$  2 378$  2 494$   2 590$   2 667$   
Right to use lease assets -$     -$     -$      -$      653$     790$     1 040$  1 238$  1 424$  1 575$  1 610$  1 709$  1 820$  1 929$  2 043$   2 157$   2 274$   
Other Current Liabibilities (18)$     (8)$       (9)$        (16)$      (19)$      (19)$      (23)$      (29)$      (32)$      (36)$      (38)$      (39)$      (41)$      (42)$      (44)$       (45)$       (46)$       
Other non-current assets 7$        11$      20$       31$       37$       42$       57$       66$       75$       84$       87$       93$       100$     107$     114$      122$      130$      
Other non-current liabilities (43)$     (50)$     (48)$      (59)$      (82)$      (4)$        (4)$        (4)$        (4)$        (4)$        (4)$        (4)$        (4)$        (4)$        (4)$         (4)$         (4)$         
Non-current income taxes payable -$     -$     -$      (48)$      (42)$      (48)$      -$      -$      -$      -$      -$      -$      -$      -$      -$       -$       -$       
Invested Capital (excluding goodwilll and intagible assets) 429$    549$    637$     614$     606$     1 723$  2 260$  2 737$  3 228$  3 661$  3 937$  4 255$  4 559$  4 836$  5 096$   5 336$   5 559$   
Goodwill & Intagible Assets, Net 26$      25$      25$       25$       24$       24$       24$       24$       24$       24$       24$       24$       24$       24$       24$        24$        24$        
Invested Capital 455$    574$    661$     639$     630$     1 748$  2 285$  2 761$  3 252$  3 685$  3 962$  4 279$  4 583$  4 860$  5 121$   5 360$   5 583$   
Excess of Cash 622$    453$    680$     928$     804$     1 034$  1 224$  1 430$  1 562$  1 646$  1 500$  1 517$  1 592$  1 683$  1 805$   1 947$   2 113$   
Other financial Assets -$     -$     -$      (1)$        (1)$        -$      -$      -$      -$      -$      -$      -$      -$      -$      -$       -$       -$       
 Tax loss carry forward, Net 9$        12$      16$       36$       3$         28$       36$       30$       43$       47$       46$       51$       55$       58$       62$        66$        70$        
Total Fund Invested 1 086$ 1 038$ 1 357$  1 601$  1 436$  2 810$  3 544$  4 220$  4 857$  5 378$  5 507$  5 848$  6 230$  6 601$  6 988$   7 374$   7 766$   
Sources 2,014 2,015 2,016 2,017 2,018 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 2025F 2026F 2027F 2028F 2029F 2030F
Operating deferred taxes 16$      26$      24$       21$       15$       35$       39$       47$       63$       73$       85$       95$       101$     107$     112$      115$      117$      
Common stock 0,66$   0,64$   0,64$    0,63$    0,61$    0,62$    0,62$    0,62$    0,62$    0,62$    0,62$    0,62$    0,62$    0,62$    0,62$     0,62$     0,62$     
Retained earnings 1 262$ 1 265$ 1 561$  1 739$  1 662$  2 193$  2 682$  3 166$  3 617$  3 993$  4 096$  4 347$  4 629$  4 904$  5 191$   5 478$   5 771$   
Accumulated Other Comprehensive Loss (173)$   (238)$   (202)$    (143)$    (217)$    (240)$    (263)$    (285)$    (308)$    (331)$    (354)$    (377)$    (400)$    (422)$    (445)$     (468)$     (491)$     
Equity and Its Equivalents 1 105$ 1 053$ 1 384$  1 618$  1 461$  1 989$  2 459$  2 928$  3 373$  3 735$  3 828$  4 066$  4 332$  4 590$  4 858$   5 126$   5 397$   
Current Lease Liabilities -$     -$     -$      -$      164$     157$     206$     245$     282$     312$     319$     339$     361$     382$     405$      427$      451$      
Non-current Lease Liabilitites -$     -$     -$      -$      531$     683$     899$     1 071$  1 232$  1 362$  1 393$  1 478$  1 575$  1 669$  1 767$   1 866$   1 967$   
Non Operating deferred taxes (19)$     (15)$     (27)$      (17)$      (24)$      (19)$      (20)$      (24)$      (29)$      (31)$      (32)$      (35)$      (37)$      (40)$      (43)$       (46)$       (48)$       
Debt and Its Equivalents (19)$     (15)$     (27)$      (17)$      (24)$      821$     1 086$  1 292$  1 485$  1 643$  1 679$  1 782$  1 898$  2 011$  2 129$   2 248$   2 369$   
-$     -$     -$      -$      -$      -$      -$      -$      -$      -$      -$      -$      -$      -$       -$       -$       
Equity + Debt 1 086$ 1 038$ 1 357$  1 601$  1 436$  2 810$  3 544$  4 220$  4 857$  5 378$  5 507$  5 848$  6 230$  6 601$  6 988$   7 374$   7 766$   
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Disclosures and Disclaimers 
 
Report  Recommendations 
Buy Expected total return (including expected capital gains and expected dividend yield) 
of more than 10% over a 12-month period. 
Hold Expected total return (including expected capital gains and expected dividend yield) 
between 0% and 10% over a 12-month period. 
Sell Expected negative total return (including expected capital gains and expected 
dividend yield) over a 12-month period. 
 
 
This report was prepared by Maria do Carmo Cruz, a Master in Finance student of Nova School of Business 
and Economics (“Nova SBE”), within the context of the Field Lab – Equity Research. 
This report is issued and published exclusively for academic purposes, namely for academic evaluation and 
master graduation purposes, within the context of said Field Lab – Equity Research. It is not to be construed 
as an offer or a solicitation of an offer to buy or sell any security or financial instrument. 
This report was supervised by a Nova SBE faculty member, acting merely in an academic capacity, who revised 
the valuation methodology and the financial model. 
Given the exclusive academic purpose of the reports produced by Nova SBE students, it is Nova SBE 
understanding that Nova SBE, the author, the present report and its publishing, are excluded from the persons 
and activities requiring previous registration from local regulatory authorities. As such, Nova SBE, its faculty 
and the author of this report have not sought or obtained registration with or certification as financial analyst by 
any local regulator, in any jurisdiction. In Portugal, neither the author of this report nor his/her academic 
supervisor is registered with or qualified under COMISSÃO DO MERCADO DE VALORES MOBILIÁRIOS (“CMVM”, the 
Portuguese Securities Market Authority) as a financial analyst. No approval for publication or distribution of this 
report was required and/or obtained from any local authority, given the exclusive academic nature of the report. 
The additional disclaimers also apply:  
USA: Pursuant to Section 202 (a) (11) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, neither Nova SBE nor the author 
of this report are to be qualified as an investment adviser and, thus, registration with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”, United States of America’s securities market authority) is not necessary. 













Germany: Pursuant to §34c of the WpHG (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, i.e., the German Securities Trading Act), 
this entity is not required to register with or otherwise notify the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht 
(“BaFin”, the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority). It should be noted that Nova SBE is a fully-
owned state university and there is no relation between the student’s equity reports and any fund raising 
programme. 
UK: Pursuant to section 22 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (the “FSMA”), for an activity to be 
a regulated activity, it must be carried on “by way of business”. All regulated activities are subject to prior 
authorization by the Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”). However, this report serves an exclusively academic 
purpose and, as such, was not prepared by way of business. The author - a Master’s student - is the sole and 
exclusive responsible for the information, estimates and forecasts contained herein, and for the opinions 
expressed, which exclusively reflect his/her own judgment at the date of the report. Nova SBE and its faculty 
have no single and formal position in relation to the most appropriate valuation method, estimates or projections 
used in the report and may not be held liable by the author’s choice of the latter. 
The information contained in this report was compiled by students from public sources believed to be reliable, 
but Nova SBE, its faculty, or the students make no representation that it is accurate or complete, and accept 
no liability whatsoever for any direct or indirect loss resulting from the use of this report or of its content. 
Students are free to choose the target companies of the reports. Therefore, Nova SBE may start covering 
and/or suspend the coverage of any listed company, at any time, without prior notice. The students or Nova 
SBE are not responsible for updating this report, and the opinions and recommendations expressed herein may 
change without further notice. 
The target company or security of this report may be simultaneously covered by more than one student. 
Because each student is free to choose the valuation method, and make his/her own assumptions and 
estimates, the resulting projections, price target and recommendations may differ widely, even when referring 
to the same security. Moreover, changing market conditions and/or changing subjective opinions may lead to 
significantly different valuation results. Other students’ opinions, estimates and recommendations, as well as 
the advisor and other faculty members’ opinions may be inconsistent with the views expressed in this report. 
Any recipient of this report should understand that statements regarding future prospects and performance are, 
by nature, subjective, and may be fallible. 
This report does not necessarily mention and/or analyze all possible risks arising from the investment in the 
target company and/or security, namely the possible exchange rate risk resulting from the security being 
denominated in a currency either than the investor’s currency, among many other risks. 
The purpose of publishing this report is merely academic and it is not intended for distribution among private 
investors. The information and opinions expressed in this report are not intended to be available to any person 
other than Portuguese natural or legal persons or persons domiciled in Portugal. While preparing this report, 












particular needs of any specific person. Investors should seek financial advice regarding the appropriateness 
of investing in any security, namely in the security covered by this report. 
The author hereby certifies that the views expressed in this report accurately reflect his/her personal opinion 
about the target company and its securities. He/ She has not received or been promised any direct or indirect 
compensation for expressing the opinions or recommendation included in this report. 
[If applicable, it shall be added: “While preparing the report, the author may have performed an internship 
(remunerated or not) in Lululemon Athletic. This Company may have or have had an interest in the covered 
company or security” and/ or “A draft of the reports have been shown to the covered company’s officials 
(Investors Relations Officer or other), mainly for the purpose of correcting inaccuracies, and later modified, prior 
to its publication.”]  
The content of each report has been shown or made public to restricted parties prior to its publication in Nova 
SBE’s website or in Bloomberg Professional, for academic purposes such as its distribution among faculty 
members for students’ academic evaluation. 
Nova SBE is a state-owned university, mainly financed by state subsidies, students tuition fees and companies, 
through donations, or indirectly by hiring educational programs, among other possibilities. Thus, Nova SBE 
may have received compensation from the target company during the last 12 months, related to its fundraising 
programs, or indirectly through the sale of educational, consulting or research services. Nevertheless, no 
compensation eventually received by Nova SBE is in any way related to or dependent on the opinions 
expressed in this report. The Nova School of Business and Economics does not deal for or otherwise offer any 
investment or intermediation services to market counterparties, private or intermediate customers. 
This report may not be reproduced, distributed or published, in whole or in part, without the explicit previous 
consent of its author, unless when used by Nova SBE for academic purposes only. At any time, Nova SBE may 
decide to suspend this report reproduction or distribution without further notice. Neither this document nor any 
copy of it may be taken, transmitted or distributed, directly or indirectly, in any country either than Portugal or 
to any resident outside this country. The dissemination of this document other than in Portugal or to Portuguese 
citizens is therefore prohibited and unlawful. 
